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ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS: STATE AND FEDERAL
APPliCATIONS AND THEIR FUTURE IN MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION

To combat the transportation of illegal drugs, many law enforcement agents rely on anticipatory search warrants. 1 Given the
ease with which illegal drugs can be moved, waiting until they actually reach a location before obtaining a warrant may allow suspects
to destroy or transfer the contraband before the warrant is executed. 2 The typical scenario for which law enforcement officials seek
anticipatory warrants occurs when customs officials inspect international packages coming into the United States. 3 When customs
agents alert federal or local law enforcement authorities that a package contains illegal drugs, the police cooperate with postal service
officials to determine the approximate time delivery of the contraband will be made. 4 This information and any other relevant facts
contributing to a probable cause determination is then set forth in
an affidavit upon which a search warrant may be issued. s
Anticipatory warrants are used to seize contraband delivered by
one of three means: (1) a controlled delivery, where a police officer
poses as a delivery person and transfers the contraband; (2) an observed delivery, where customs officials intercept the contraband
and notify the police who observe the contraband as it is delivered;
and (3) an uncontrolled delivery where police receive a tip that
contraband will be delivered, but are unaware as to who will be
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

See, e.g., Sean R. O'Brien, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth
Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1305, 1334 (1993) (recognizing law enforcement's increased reliance on anticipatory warrants corresponding "with the escalation of the government's so-called 'war on drugs' H); see also BlACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 93 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an anticipatory search warrant as "[a]
warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future
time, but not presently, certain evidence of crime will be located at specified
place; such warrant is to be distinguished from a premature search").
See Alvidres v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
("The speed with which law enforcement is often required to act, especially
when dealing with the furtive and transitory activities of persons who traffic in
narcotics, demands that the courts make every effort to assist law enforcement
in complying with the edicts that the courts themselves have issued.").
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE. SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.7(c), at 362-63 (3d ed. 1996).
See id. at 363.
See id.
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making the delivery.6
However, in none of these situations would a traditional search
warrant uphold the subsequent search and seizure by law enforcement. Based on probable cause that evidence of a crime will be at a
specified location, the anticipatory search warrant is very different
from a traditional search warrant.? Whereas anticipatory search warrants focus on the future, traditional search warrants are based on
probable cause that evidence of a crime is presently at a specified
loc,ation. R
Some courts consider this distinction crucial, concluding that
anticipatory warrants violate the Fourth Amendment9 or state statutes lO and suppressing evidence gathered pursuant to them. II Likewise, defendants frequently challenge the evidence obtained pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant on constitutional grounds. 12
They argue that anticipatory search warrants are not issued on the
belief that contraband is present at the specified location described
in the affidavit. 13 Yet, a majority of courts conclude otherwise, permitting the State to use evidence gathered from the execution of
anticipatory search warrants in its case-in-chief.14 Although the Su6,
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

See Robert A, Messina, Anticipatary Search Warrants: Striking a Balance Between Privacy Rights and Police Action, 22 S, ILL, U, LJ 391, 405 (1998).
.
See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 362.
See id. at 364.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONSI'. amend. IV.
See infra Section III.B.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (requiring the suppression of evidence g'athered in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 364.
See id.
-See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholdi~g the validity of an anticipatory warrant based on an affidavit indicating that
a courier planned to deliver marijuana to a residence and that execution was
contingent on delivery); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1426 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1169 (1997) (explaining that anticipatory search
warrants are valid when they are based on probable cause that property will
be located at a designated place at the time of the search); United States v.
Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1137 (1997) (aftirming the validity of anticipatory warrants, even though the suspect left the
premises with the package under surveillance prior to the execution of the
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preme Court has not directly ruled on the issue, it would likely affirm the validity of anticipatory search warrants under the Fourth
Amendment. 15
In Maryland, the court of appeals has taken a stance seemingly
out of tune with much of the country. In Kostelec v. State,16 the court
narrowly interpreted the language of section 551 (a) of Article 27 of
the Annotated Code of Maryland 17 and suppressed evidence gathered pursuant to an anticipatory warrant. IS The court of appeals
sent a message to the Maryland General Assembly that it must
amend the law if anticipatory search warrants are to be valid under

15.
16.
17.

18.

warrant); United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing
that an anticipatory warrant is valid when contraband in the mail is on an irreversible course to a known destination); United States V. Gendron, 18 F.3d
955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that anticipatory warrants are valid when a
court found probable cause after the package in question was delivered by
mail and taken to the defendant's residence); United States V. Bieri, 21 F.3d
811, 814 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the validity of an anticipatory warrant
when probable cause was based on an affidavit stating that a courier planned
to deliver marijuana to a residence and the execution of the warrant was contingent on the delivery); United States V. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir.
1993) (affirming the constitutionality of an anticipatory warrant issued to
search a package en route to a location where cocaine was present); United
States V. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an anticipatory
warrant is valid when a magistrate reasonably concluded that the defendant's
home was the final destination for contraband discovered in the mail);
United States V. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that an anticipatory warrant is valid when the contraband in question is on a
course to a definite location) (citing United States V. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36
(4th Cir. 1988».
See infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text.
348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1957 & Supp. 1996). The statute provides, in
pertinent part: Whenever it be made to appear to any judge . . . by written
application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affidavit ... containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant ... that
there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set forth in said affidavit ... to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed by any individual or in any building ... or that any property subject to seizure under
the criminal laws of the State is situated or located on the person of any such
individual or in or on any such building ... then the judge may forthwith issue a search warrant. . .. [d. (emphasis added). The Kostelec court interpreted the phrases "is being committed" and "is situated or located" Iitera1ly--events giving rise to probable cause must be occurring as of the time
when the affidavit for a search warrant is sworn. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 236,
703 A.2d at 163.
See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 243, 703 A.2d at 166.
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Maryland law. 19 If the Maryland General Assembly were to statutorily
eliminate anticipatory search warrants, only constitutional grounds
would remain for a defendant's challenge. 2o
This Comment examines the future of anticipatory search warrants on the state and federal level. In Part II, this Comment reviews the federal courts' treatment of anticipatory searches, discussing why such warrants have been upheld and why some courts have
decided to strike them down. 21 In Part III, this Comment explores
how various states h~ve dealt with anticipatory search warrants,22 In
Part N, this Comment traces the evolution of Maryland's treatment
of anticipatory search warrants, how Kostelec affected that evolution,
and the state's future handling of the issue. 23 In Part V, this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's handling of similar Fourth
Amendment issues and forecasts its opinion on the constitutionality
of anticipatory search warrants. 24 In Part VI, this Comment examines why anticipatory search warrants are used and examines the debate between those who support anticipatory search warrants and
those who do not. 25 Further, this Section focuses on the benefits
and detriments of the use of anticipatory warrants by law enforcement personnel,26 Finally, in Part VII, this Comment concludes that
courts addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants must strike a
delicate balance to account for the personal interests and rights
guaranteed under Maryland and Federal Constitutional law.
II. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN FEDERAL COURTS
Prior to its change in 1990, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41 (a) authorized the issuance of a search warrant by certain judicial
officers "within the district wherein the property or person sought
is located."27 In 1990, the words of limitation, "is located," were re19.

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

The Kostelec court's remarks suggest that for anticipatory warrants to be upheld in Maryland, section 551 must be amended to include the language "will
be located." See id. at 236-37,703 A.2d at 163.
See id. at 241, 703 A.2d at 165..66 (recognizing that anticipatory warrants raise
potential Fourth Amendment concerns). The court did not address the con..
stitutionality of anticipatory searches under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
See supra notes 27.. 130 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131 ..211 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 287..99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30~21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 322..32 and accompanying text.
See FED. R CRIM. P. 41(a) (1989).
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moved from the rule. 28 Rule 41 (a)(l) now reads: "Upon the request
of a federal law .enforcement officer or an attorney for the go~ern
me nt, a search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued
(I) . . . for a search of property or for a person within the district. "29 The amendment of the rule removed the requirement that
the items listed in an affidavit be at the specified location at the
time the affidavit is sworn. 30 This change effectively validated anticipatory search warrants under the federal rules. 31
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the issue of anticipatory search warrants,32 it has laid out the standards
on which probable cause for a search warrant is based. 33 The Fourth
Amendment provides that no warrants shall be issued, but upon
probable cause. 34 Therefore, a court may issue a warrant only if
there is probable cause to believe that seizable evidence will be
28.
29.

30.
31.

32.

33.

34.

See id.
fd. Additionally, the advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: Rule 41(a)(I) pennits anticipatory warrants byomitting the words "is located" which in the past required that in all instances the
object of the search had to be located within the district at the time the warrant was issued. Now a search for property or a person within the district, or
expected to be within the district, is valid if it otherwise complies with the
rule. fd. (advisory committee note).
See id.
See Richard A. Powers, III, Anticipatory Search Warrants: FutUTr! Probabli! Cause, 28
CRIM. L. BULL 59, 6().61 (1992) (discussing the effect of the 1990 amendments
to Rule 41 on the validity of anticipatory warrants).
While not ruling directly on the issue, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
in dicta that warrants can be anticipatory. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 102 (1979) (Rehnquist, j., dissenting) (noting that a warrant is by definition "an anticipatory authorization"); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257
n.19 (1979) (finding that officers are not required to set forth the anticipated
means for execution); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 450 n.15 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "a warrant based on anticipated
facts is premature and void"). The Court has also implied the legality of anticipatory warrants by upholding the validity of wiretapping to collect evidence
for arrest. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1967); see also James A.
Adams, Anticipatory Search Warrants: Constitutionality, Requirements, and Scope, 79
KY. LJ. 681, 688-90 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that imply anticipatory warrants are valid).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)
(concluding that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); CHARLES WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CAsES AND CoN·
CEPTS § 4.05 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the probable cause standard for
searches and seizures).
See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.

342

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

found on the premises or person to be searched. 35
While a majority of federal courts have held .that anticipatory
search warrants are consistent with the Fourth Amendment,36 a few
cases are commonly cited by defendants that challenge the validity
of such warrants. 37 In United States v. Travisano,38 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that government
agents had sufficiently established probable cause by demonstrating
that a crime had been committed and that stolen property was located at the residence to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. 39 In Travisano, Connecticut police were investigating a shooting and robbery.40 Within twenty-four hours of the crime, the police
located a vehicle matching the description of the suspected getaway
vehicle parked outside of a residence. 41 Securing a search warrant
for the residence and automobile, law enforcement officials could
not locate the instrumentalities of the crime; however, officials did
find an unregistered firearm in the house and subsequently sought
an indictment. 42 The court found sufficient probable cause to support the admission of the unregistered firearm, primarily relying on
the location of the suspected getaway vehicle outside of the residence. 43 Although the court found that probable cause existed, the
court's language, "probable cause to believe that evidence of such

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (observing that
probable cause requires evidence that would warrant a reasonable person to
believe a felony has been committed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925) (explaining that officers had probable cause to conduct a search
and seizure of an automobile because "the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient" to justify a search).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that probable cause to search a residence requires a belief that evidence
of a crime is located at that residence); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d
653, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing that at the time officers conduct a search,
facts should exist to justify that the object of the search is present); United
States v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 1964) (concluding that "a search
warrant is based upon a judicial determination of the present existence of justifying grounds-i.e., at the time of the issuance of the warrant").
724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1983).
See id. at 345.
See id. at 342-43.
See id. at 342.
See id.
See id. at 34647.
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crime is located,"44 is often cited to support the propositi(m that a
warrant is only valid if the evidence in question is present at the
specified location at the time the warrant is sworn. 45
In Unite4 States v. Rundle,46 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit concluded that probable cause had not been
established by a showing that legal materials required to perform
future illegal activities were at a specified location. 47 Here, law enforcement officials conducted a warrant-based search of an illegal
abortion clinic. 48 The affidavit underlying the warrant stated that
materials to perform abortions were located at the address. 49 The
court held that the possession of such materials alone-which by
themselves were not illegal-was insufficient to create probable
cause, because there was no demonstration that illegal behavior was
presently occurring. 50 The Rundle court observed: "A search warrant
is based upon a judicial determination of the present existence of
justifying grounds-Le., at the time of the issuance of the warrant."51 Therefore, the court concluded that the illegally seized
materials should not have been used as evidence in the defendant's
conviction. 52
In United States v. Hendricks,53 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likewise held that an anticipatory search
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 54 In Hendricks, customs officials intercepted a package shipped from Brazil to Arizona. 55 Unlike other cases involving anticipatory warrants, the package was not
mailed directly to the defendant's address. 56 The address on the
package was for identification purposes only; the defendant had to
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

[d. at 345 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584

(1971» . .
See Gendron v.United States, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (lst Cir. 1994).
327 F:2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964).
See id. at 160.
See id. at 155.
See id.
See id at 163.
[d. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 258 F.2d 435, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(Bazelon, j., concurring».
See id. at 165. However, the defendant's conviction was not overturned because
he failed to: exhaust his State's available remedies before ptfisuing habeas
corpus relief. See id.
743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 656.
See id. at 653.
See id.
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personally pick up the package at the airport. 57 When inspected by
customs officials, the package contained five to seven pounds of cocaine. 58 Despite the fact that the package was not to be delivered to
the defendant's home, Drug Enforcement Agency personnel obtained a search warrant for his home. 59
The Hendricks court held that the search warrant based on the
contents of a package did not establish sufficient probable cause to
support the issuance of a warrant to search the defendant's home. 60
The court further concluded that the magistrate issuing the warrant
could not have reasonably concluded that the defendant would pick
up the box and take it to his residence. 61 At the time the warrant
was issued, the magistrate knew that the package was not at the
defendant's home. 62 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no showing of probable
cause to support a conclusion that the package was at the listed address at the time of the issuance of the warrant63 and that there was
an insufficient nexus between the box and the residence. 64 The
court explained: "The facts must be sufficient to justify a conclusion ... that the property which is the object of the search is probably on the person or premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. "65
Therefore, according to the Travisano, Rundle, and Hendricks
courts, the Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause exist at
57.
58.

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.

64.

65.

See id.
See id. The court likened the officials' contact of the defendant to "a situation
where police create the exigent circumstances and then use the existence of
those exigencies to justify a search." Id. at 654 n.l (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980».
See id. at 653-54.
See id. at 655. The court observed that a telephonic warrant-issued as the
events giving rise to probable cause occurred-was a preferable substitute for
the anticipatory warrant. See id. at 655 n.2.
See id. at 655.
See id. at 654.
See id. at 655. Although the court did recognize that other courts applied the
"on a sure course" test, it concluded that no probable cause existed because
Hendricks had not even attempted to pick up the box (which would not have
been delivered to his address by the carrier) at the time of the warrant's issuance. See id.
See id. However, the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule because the
officer's reliance was not unreasonable under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984). See id. at 656. For a discussion of Leon, see infra notes 263-64 and
accqmpanying text.
Id. (quoting Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1968».
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the time of the issuance of the warrant. 66 Otherwise, the search is
unreasonable and any evidence gathered will be suppressed at the
subsequent trial. 67 However, several other federal courts conclude
differently by concentrating on whether sufficient information exists
to support a warrant before the contraband or other evidence of a
crime is at a particular location.

A. The "On a Sure Course" Test
Notwithstanding Travisano, Rundle, and Hendricks, federal courts
often uphold anticipatory warrants that involve a controlled delivery
of contraband that is "on a sure course to its destination" through
the mail. 68 In United States v. Dornhofer,69 the United States Court of
66.

67.
68.

Compare United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that agents had established probable cause prior to entering the defendant's residence, and therefore refusing to suppress the evidence that was
seized), with United States V. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1964) (suppressing evidence seized from an abortion clinic where the officers who had
obtained the warrant had no grounds to believe illegal contraband would be
found), and Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 656 (invalidating a search warrant for a
home that was not based on facts establishing probable cause that evidence of
a crime would be on the premises at the time the warrant was issued).
See Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See United States V. Domhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying on
the "sure course" of a package containing child pornography to uphold the
validity of an anticipatory warrant contingent on law enforcement's mailing of
the package to the original address); see also United States V. Becerra, 97 F.3d
669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming the defendant's drug conviction based on
evidence gathered during a search supported by an anticipatory warrant and
executed via a controlled delivery) (citing United States V. Garcia, 882 F.2d
699,702 (2d Cir. 1989»; United States V. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333-34 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that a postal inspector's controlled delivery of contraband
videotape complied with the "on a sure course" test); United States V. Jackson, 55 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that probable cause to
search for evidence of drug trafficking had been established when law enforcement officials conducted a controlled delivery of a package of heroin
and the package was accepted, even though a suspect subsequently fled from
the residence with the package); United States V. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965-67
(1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a package containing a videotape of child pornography, which was delivered to the address on the package and taken into
the residence, established probable cause that evidence of a crime would be
located in the house); United States V. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 949-51 (8th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a package of hashish and marijuana placed in the
mail for controlled delivery to the address on the package, and received into
the residence by the addressee, established probable cause); United States V.
Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[C]ontraband does not have to
be presently located at the place described in the warrant if there is probable
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conducted a representative analysis
under this test. Here, law enforcement officials conducted a sting
operation to detect buyers of child pornography.70 When the
defendant accepted the sting operation's mailed offer, law enforcement officials obtained an anticipatory warrant for his house, conditioned on the placement of the materials in the mail.? 1 Observing
the defendant retrieve the pornography from his mailbox and return to his residence, law enforcement officials conducted a search
of the defendant's house.72 The court noted that an article must be
"on a slire course" to its destination to create a constitutionally
valid anticipatory search warrant.1 3 The court upheld the trial
court's admission of the evidence gathered during the search because law enforcement officials fulfilled the condition in the warrant-the package was placed in the mail and delivered to the
defendant. 74 In making this conclusion, the court relied on the high
level of certairity that an item will be delivered to the exact address
provided to the postal service or a parcel post service. 75
In United States v. Gendron,76 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
further refined the "on a sure course" test by discussing the particularity of the "triggering event," or condition precedent to the execution of an anticipatory warrant. 77 In Gendron, a man ordered child
pornography from a company that, unbeknownst to him, was part
of a government sting operation. 78 Law enforcement agents sent the
defendant the videotape that he had ordered and obtained a search
warrant for his home to be executed on the tape's arrival.7 9 The
videotape was delivered, the search was executed, and the tape was

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.").
859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988).
See itt. at 1197.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1198. The court remarked that it had "adopted" the analysis of the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468.{)9 (9th Cir. 1986).
See id. However, the Hale court actually applied a very expansive version of
this test. See infra notes. 105-13 and accompanying text.
See Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1198.
See id.; United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1195 (6th Cir. 1978).
18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
See id. at 967 (holding that a search warrant issued for a contraband videotape
addressed to and received at the place to be searched is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment).
See id. at 957.
See id. at 970.
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seized as evidence. 8o The defendant argued that the government's
search warrant was defective because it did not adequately specify
when the warrant would take effect. 8)
The court in Gendron concluded that the simple "fact that a
warrant is 'anticipatory' ... does not invalidate a warrant or make it
somehow suspect or legally disfavored. "82 The court also noted that
the Constitution does not impose the requirement that warrants
take effect upon issuance; rather the Constitution requires that they
are not unreasonable and that they are supported by probable
cause. 83 The court further explained that there was nothing unreasonable about authorizing a search for a future date when reliable
information indicates that contraband will reach a specified location
some time in the future. 84
The Gendron court noted that in principle, the use of some
"triggering event," contraband being delivered to a certain location
to determine when a warrant will go into effect, can help assure
that the search takes place only when justified by " 'probable
cause.' ,"85 The court concluded that anticipatory warrants may thus
increase, rather than decrease, the protection against unreasonable
intrusioris into a citizen's privacy.86
Several courts have also applied a loose interpretation of the
"particularity requirement" of the Fourth Amendment87 for antici80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.

87.

See id.
See id. at 965.
[d.
See id.
See id.; United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a warrant that will only become effective upon the happening of
some future event is not unconstitutional per se).
Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965.
See id.; see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.7(c), at 97. Professor LaFave
observed:
[A]s a general proposition the facts put forward to justify issuance of
an anticipatory warrant are more likely to establish that probable
cause will exist at the time of the search than the typical warrant
based solely upon the known prior location of the items to be seized
at the place to be searched.
[d.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (discussing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement as a protection
against "[a] general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings"); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (discussing the particularity requirement as it relates to things to be seized by law enforcement officers and noting that" [a]s to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
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patory warrants. 88 In United States v. Dennis,89 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the sufficiency of the
conditions precedent to the execution of an anticipatory warrant90
and of the nexus between the package, defendants, and residence
to be searched. 91 Determining that a package matched a "drug
package profile" and conducting a drug dog sniff, a postal inspector
opened a package to discover that it contained cocaine.92 The postal
inspector then sealed the package with an electronic beeper enclosed in the package and sought an anticipatory warrant to search

88.

89.
90.
91.

92.

officer executing the warrant" (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
196 (1927))); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886) (explaining
that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment prevents government officials from initiating broad, unfounded searches of citizens homes);
see also Larry EchoHawk & Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant that Fails
to Particularly Describe the Place to be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (explaining that when assessing a particularity challenge "the ultimate inquiry is
always whether the terms of the warrant limited the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant").
See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We conclude
only that the necessary conditions [precedent] must appear in the courtissued warrant and attachments that those executing the search maintain in
their immediate possession in order to guide their actions and to provide information to the person whose property is being searched."); United States v.
Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the conditions precedent to
execution of the anticipatory warrant had been adequately stated in the warrant's accompanying affidavit); Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085-86 (upholding the
validity of an anticipatory warrant as the conditions precedent to its execution
were adequately set forth· on the warrant's face).
115 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 528-29.
See id. at 529-31. In its consideration of the nexus between the package, the
defendants, and the residence to be searched, the court recognized the presence of at least two alternatives-the "on a sure course" test and the Garcia
test-to establishing probable cause. See id. at 530. Although the court noted
that several jurisdictions held that placing contraband in the mail to an address satisfied the "on a sure course" test, see id. at 530 (citing United States v.
Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854
F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th
Cir. 1986)), it held that the Garcia test would also be satisfied. See id. at 530-31.
For this conclusion, the court relied on the postal. inspector's experience in
profiling, the excessive quantity of cocaine (which negated any possibility that
the product was sent on a whim), and the defendant's connections to previous drug trafficking activities. See id. For a discussion of the Garcia test, see infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
See Dennis, 115 F.3d at 527.
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the defendant's residence at the listed address. 93 The sole condition
precedent was established in the affidavit, not in the actual warrant
underlying the search. 94
In his subsequent challenge to the evidence gathered during
the controlled delivery, the defendant argued that the warrant was
facially void because it failed to provide the conditions precedent to
the search. 95 Even though the affidavit was not attached to the warrant, the court nonetheless held that the affidavit sufficiently set
forth the conditions precedent to the search. 96 The court
concluded:
The face of the warrant stated that execution of the warrant
was subject to the conditions stated in the affidavit. This evidences that the issuing judge read and considered the affidavit in issuing the warrant. The record also establishes that
the officers complied with the conditions precedent in executing the warrant. 97
In United States v. Hugoboom,98 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit echoed the sentiments of the Dennis
court by refusing to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a warrant that did not explicitly set forth all conditions precedent to the
search. 99 Much like in Dennis, the postal inspector involved in
Hugoboom noticed that a package matched a drug profile and ordered a drug dog sniff.l00 Conducting a controlled delivery, law enforcement officials searched the house and arrested the defend93.
94.

95.
96.

See id.
As issued by the magistrate and incorporated by the actual warrant, the affidavit requested permission to search each floor of the two-story residence only if
an occupant of that floor opened the package. See id. at 528. Therefore, only
if the resident of the first floor accepted or opened the package could law enforcement personnel search the first floor. See id.

See id.
See id. at 529. In support, the Dennis court relied on United States v. Moetamedi,
46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995), where the court concluded: "[A] n anticipatory
warrant need not state on its face the conditions precedent for its execution
if the warrant affidavit contains 'clear, explicit, and narrowly drawn' conditions and the executing officers actually satisry those conditions before executing the warrant." [d. (quoting Moetamedi, 46 F.3d at 229).
97. [d. (footnote omitted).
98. 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997).
99. See id. at 1085-86.
100. See id. at 1083.
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ant.101 In response to the defendant's argument that the warrant was
defective because it did not specify the conditions precedent to the
warrant, the court noted:
Many, if not most, search warrants are effective upon issuance and may be executed immediately thereafter. However,
an anticipatory warrant.. .is not unconstitutional per se
and is, indeed, no stranger to the law. Such warrants have
repeatedly been upheld, assuming probable cause and so
long as the conditions precedent to execution are clearly
set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the
anticipatory warrant.102
Concluding that the package was "on a sure course" to the
defendant's residence, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction
and refused to overturn the lower court's denial of the motion to
suppress. 103
Although the "on a sure course" test has served as a starting
point for determining the validity of anticipatory warrants, some
federal circuits have loosely interpreted the test's parameters. 104 As
demonstrated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Hale,105 some federal courts have
significantly relaxed the requirements of the test. In Hale, customs
officials notified the defendant that a shipment of sexually explicit
material had been intercepted and confiscated. I06 Hale chose not to
respond to this notification and did not attempt to receive the illegal material. 107 Customs inspectors then confiscated the remainder
of Hale's order when it arrived in the country in four separate enveSee id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1085 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1087.
See United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that
the search of a residence pursuant to an anticipatory warrant was valid even
though the contraband was removed from the address on which the warrant
was based prior to the execution of the warrant); United States v. Gendron,
18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding an anticipatory warrant to be valid
even though the warrant did not state the exact time at which the controlled
delivery of the package was to take place).
105. 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Weber, 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. See id. at 1467. The shipment was part of an order he had placed with a
Netherlands distributor. See id.
107. See id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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lopes. lOS Rather than notifying Hale of these actions, customs agents
sought a warrant for Hale's residence based on their intention "to
have the previously described envelopes delivered as addressed by
an employee of the United States Postal Service."I09 A controlled delivery of the pornography was made to Hale's residence and he was
subsequently arrested. 110
Hale challenged the validity of the search warrant for his home
on the grounds that it was anticipatory in nature. lll The court held
that the "on a sure course" test had been satisfied because the contraband on which the warrant was based was originally addressed to
Hale's residence for delivery)'2 Although the court reasoned that
customs officials had not interfered with the destination of Hale's
mail, customs officials did have control over whether or not the
contraband was actually delivered. ll3 It is clear that customs agents
initially intercepted Hale's pornographic material so that it would
not be delivered, but subsequently had it delivered to justify a
search of Hale's residence for other evidence of criminality. In doing so, customs officials manipulated the delivery of contraband to
serve their own purposes, thus distorting the underlying purposes of
the "on a sure course" test.
B. An Alternative Analysis-The Garcia Test

However, not all federal courts have applied the "on a sure
course" test when confronted with the constitutional validity of anticipatory warrants. In United States v. Garcia,1l4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an anticipatory
search warrant, without determining whether the evidence was on a
"sure course to a known destination.""5 Instead, the Garcia court focused on independent evidence demonstrating probable cause." 6
Although recognizing that other courts predicate anticipatory warrants on a search for contraband that "is on a sure course to its des108. See id.
109. [d.
110. See id. at 1468.
11 1. See id.
112. See id. at 1469.
113. See id. at 1470.

114. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989).
115. [d. at 703-04. In fact, the contraband was in two duffel bags which were being
carried by drug couriers. See id. at 700·01. Mter customs agents discovered

drugs in the bags, the couriers gave up the defendant and agreed to make a
controlled delivery. See id.
116. See id. at 703.
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tination," the Garcia court listed criteria for determining whether an
anticipatory warrant establishes probable cause in the place of the
"on a sure course" test. ll7 In Garcia, United States servicemen stationed in Panama smuggled cocaine into the United States. liS Intercepted by customs officials in Miami,119 the two servicemen were
flown to New York, where they agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials and complete the delivery of the cocaine to
other members of the smuggling operation. 120 Police obtained an
anticipatory warrant for the home to which the servicemen were to
deliver the cocaine. 121
Unlike the frequent scenarios in which anticipatory warrants
are utilized, authorities did not mail the contraband; instead, they
played a direct role in determining how and when the contraband
reached the final destination, much like the scenario addressed by
the Hale court.122 Furthermore, the court concluded that "delivery,"
as required by the anticipatory warrant, had been made at the time
of the execution of the warrant, even though the package had not
been received by the defendant. 123 The ability of law enforcement
officials to direct the transportation of the contraband in Garcia is
quite different than the usual scenarios where the "on a sure
course" test is applied-controlled deliveries to a specific individual
at a specific address. 124
Rather than applying the "on a sure course" test, the Garcia
court required magistrates to seek "independent evidence gIvmg
rise to probable cause that the contraband will be located at the
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

122.
123.

124.

fd. at 702-04.
See id. at 70(}'() 1.
See id. at 700.

See id. at 701. Participants in the smuggling scheme usually delivered the cocaine to one of three other participants: Gabriel Grant, Celina Wilson-Grant,
or Francisca Caballero. See id. at 700.
See id. As a defendant, Wilson-Grant argued that the anticipatory warrant was
executed . prematurely because the agents conducted the search before she
took possession of the cocaine. See id. at 704. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the delivery occurred when the servicemen entered the
apartment and placed the bags containing the cocaine on the floor. See id.
See id. For a discussion of United States v. Hale, see supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 701. The servicemen were allowed in the apartment by
the husband of one of the defendants. See id. They waited 10 minutes for
someone to take possession of the bag. See id. No one did, but the DEA
agents entered, announced they had a search warrant, and searched the
apartment. See id.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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premises at the time of the search."125 Moreover, according to the
Garcia court, the affidavit underlying a warrant "must show, not only
that the [government] agent believes a delivery of contraband is going to occur, but also how [the agent] obtained this belief, how reliable his sources are, and what part government agents will play in
the delivery."126 Furthermore, the court warned that when an anticipatory warrant is issued, "the magistrate should protect against its
premature execution by listing in the warrant conditions governing
its execution which are explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to
avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents."127
Applying this analytical framework, the Garcia court concluded
that the anticipatory warrant was supported by probable cause. 128
The court found that the delivery fulfilled the clear conditions precedent of the warrant because the warrant specifically hinged on delivery by one of the serviceman, rather than delivery to a specific individual, such as any of the defendants. 129 Unlike the relatively clear
contours of the "on a sure course" test, the Garcia court applied a
more amorphous, flexible standard-much like the current standard for probable cause as dictated in Illinois v. Gates. 130

III. . ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN STATE COURTS
A. Jurisdictions Supporting the Use of Anticipatory Search Warrants
In line with the trend in the federal circuits, 131 several state
courts have upheld the use of anticipatory search warrants. 132 For
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703.
[d.
[d. at 70~.

See id. at 704.
See id.
130. 462 u.s. 213,230-31 (1983).
131. See supra Part II.
132. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1124-25 n.11 (Alaska 1980) (observing that
the better practice for issuing an anticipatory warrant would be for a judge to
"insert a direction in the search warrant making execution contingent on the
happening of an event which evidences probable cause that the item to be
seized is in the place to be searched"); State v. Cox, 522 P.2d 29, 34 (Ariz.
1974) (analyzing the validity of an anticipatory warrant based on information
that a car carrying marijuana would be entering the country); People v.
Souza, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 269-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the validity of an anticipatory warrant that was based on an individual's expectation of
meeting a party to conduct a drug transaction); Bernie v; State, 524 So. 2d
988, 991 (Fla. ·1988) (concluding that information concerning the future
transport of drugs can be used to obtain an anticipatory search warrant);
State v. Baker, 453 S.E.2d 115, 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the notion
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example, in Alvidres v. Superior Court,133 California addressed the issue of anticipatory search warrants. Here, federal authorities interthat anticipatory search warrants arc not per se illegal); State v. Wright, 772
P.2d 250, 256 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) ("Whcre there is no present possession
the supporting evidence for the prospective warrant must be strong that the
particular possession of particular property will occur and that the elements
to bring about that possession are in process and will result in the possession
at the time and place specified . . . ") (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d
614,617 (1972»); People v. Favela, 681 N.E.2d 582, 584-85 (III. App. Ct. 1997)
(discussing the amendment of a state statute to allow the issuance of anticipatory search warrants), appeal denied, 689 N.E.2d 1142 (III. 1997); Russell v.
State, 395 N.E.2d 791, 798-800 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (observing that a state
statute did not prohibit the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause to
believe evidence of a crime will be at a specific location at a future time);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221, 224-25 (Mass. 1981) (noting that a
state statute permitted the issuance of a search warrant based upon a showing
that concealment or possession is probable at the time the warrant is to be
executed); People v. Brake, 527 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(" [W] hen the affidavit shows that an identified individual has received, or anticipates receiving, specific contraband through the mail at a particular location, there is probable cause to believe that other contraband or evidence of
the crime will be found at that location."); State v. Stott, 503 N.W.2d 822, 829
(Neb. 1993) (basing a search warrant on information regarding a future date
on which the defendant would receive more marijuana); State v. Parent, 867
P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (Nev. 1994) (discussing a search warrant based on information that a future flight would enter the jurisdiction carrying cocaine); State v.
Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1101 (N.H. 1995) (observing that anticipatory search
warrants do not per se violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Ulrich, 628
A.2d 368, 371-72 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (upholding the validity of a
warrant "to be executed only if and when the specifically described event
which gives rise to probable cause actually occurs"); Glen, 282 N.E.2d at 617
(explaining that a state law requirement that search warrants be executed
"forthwith" did not bar the use of anticipatory warrants, noting that "the ultimate answer to the problem is that as long as the evidence creates a substantial probability that the scizable property will be on the premises when
search~d, the warrant should be sustained"); State v. Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710,
715-16 (N.D. 1990) (discussing the trustworthiness of an affidavit detailing circumstances of a controlled buy of drugs); State v. Folk, 599 N.E.2d 334, 337-38
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that there is no probable cause defect "as
long as the evidence creates substantial probability that the seizable property
will be on the premises when searched" (quoting Glen, 282 N.E.2d at 617»;
Commonwealth v. DiGiovanni, 630 A.2d 42, 46-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that the facts established a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a
fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband would arrive on the
premises prior to any search); see also Messina, supra note·6, at 396-97 (discussing the development of the law of anticipatory search warrants).
133. 90 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
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cepted a package addressed to the defendant's residence. 134 Finding
marijuana within the package, law enforcement officers obtained an
anticipatory warrant for Alvidres's address based on the knowledge
that the post office would deliver the package. 135 Upon delivery, the
police executed the warrant and arrested Alvidres. 136 The defendant
argued that the affidavit sworn for the search of his home was void
because it clearly demonstrated that there was no basis on which
the court could conclude that the contraband was presently on the
premises. 137
The court upheld the validity of anticipatory warrants, observing that the "entire thrust of the exclusionary rule and the cases
which have applied it is to encourage the use of search warrants by
law enforcement officials." 138 The court also emphasized that "[0] ne
of the major difficulties which confronts law enforcement in the attempt to comply with court-enunciated requirements for a 'reasonable' search and seizure is the time that is consumed in obtaining
warrants."139 Rather than striking the anticipatory warrants as violative of the Fourth Amendment, the court went so far as to "commend the participants in this procedure for their thoroughness, imagination and scrupulous compliance with the law."I40
In People v. Glen, 141 the Court of Appeals of New York issued a
similarly positive endorsement of anticipatory warrants. 142 An affidavit supporting an anticipatory search warrant averred that a package
containing narcotics consigned to the defendant, a known drug
dealer, was due to arrive at a local bus station}43 Mter the arrival of

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id. at 683.
See id. at 684.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 685. The court noted that the time frame between the issuance of the
warrant and its execution was so narrow that the court could evade the issue
of anticipatory warrants altogether. See id. at 684. The court concluded that
the warrant was valid regardless of whether it was issued before the drugs
reached the residence or after they had reached the residence. See id.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 687.
282 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 1972).
See id. at 617 (describing police use of anticipatory warrants as "laudable").
See id. at 616. The Glen court actually considered two, unrelated convictions
on the appeal. See id. at 615. Although only the facts underlying the conviction of J. Christopher Glen are discussed here, those underlying the conviction of the other defendant are somewhat similar. See id. at 615-16.
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the package, the police examined its contents. l44 Observing that the
package contained marijuana, the police placed it under surveillance. 145 On the following afternoon, Glen arrived at the bus station,
picked up the package, and was subsequently arrested. 146
The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant on
the grounds that "a necessary condition precedent to the issuance
of a search warrant is the present unlawful possession of seizable
property on the person or at the place designated in the warrant. "147 The court not only upheld the validity of the search warrant, but further concluded that anticipatory warrants may be more
reliable than traditional warrants because they predict where contraband will be at a given time. l48
The Supreme Court of Alaska also upheld a conviction based
on evidence gathered pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant issued in Johnson v. State. 149 Here, an informant notified the police
that a shipment of drugs was to be delivered to a local airport and
then transported to the defendant's home. 150 An anticipatory search
warrant was issued and two police officers were dispatched to the
airport to observe the delivery of the package. lSI Observing two individuals accept the package, the officers followed them to the
defendant's home and subsequently executed the search warrant
obtained in anticipation of the package's delivery.152 During an in144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
151.
152.

See
See
See
[d.
See

id. at 616.
id.
id.

id. at 617. The court reasoned:
At best, present possession is only probative of the likelihood of future possession. In cases [involving anticipatory search warrants] the
certainty of future possession is greater or is often greater than that
based on information of past and presumably current possession .... [I]n many kinds of organized crime the evidence supplied
to obtain warrants does not relate to current crimes but past crimes
with circumstances showing the likelihood of continuance of the
same activity. In the present cases, the evidence that there would be a
consummated prospective crime was logically and probatively
stronger. The necessary pieces were in motion and all but inevitably
the pieces would fall into a set, at a later time, constituting the
crime.
[d. at 617-18.
617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980).
See id. at 1120.
See id. at 1122.
See id.
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spection of the package and the defendant's home, the police
found a large quantity of cocaine and heroin. 153
The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant
based on the inability of an affiant to positively identify the location
of the contraband for an anticipatory search warrant. 154 The court
rejected this argument, explaining that anticipatory warrants based
on probable cause are "constitutionally permissible 'as long as the
evidence creates a substantial probability that the seizable property
will be on the premises when searched.' "155
In Commonwealth v. Soares,156 the Supreme Judicial Court for
Massachusetts also affirmed the conviction of a defendant based on
evidence garnered pursuant to an anticipatory warrant. 15? A California parcel service clerk became suspicious of a customer's behavior
when he dropped off a package. 15S Based on her authority and UPS
regulations, the clerk checked the contents of the package and discovered that it contained a cellophane bag of white powder. 159 The
employee notified her supervisor who, in tum, contacted California
state police to take control of the package. l60 A California detective
determined that the powdery substance was methamphetamine. 161
California law enforcement officials contacted the Massachusetts
state police and informed them of the package's contents and the
specific delivery address. 162 The narcotics were then repackaged and
delivered to Massachusetts. 163 The Massachusetts state police obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the address listed on the
package and on delivery of the package, executed the warrant. l64
The defendant sought to suppress all evidence recovered from
the home on the grounds that the anticipatory search warrant was
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1125.
155. Id. (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (N.Y 1972». The court also
noted that anticipatory search warrants complied with a state statute that only
required a reasonable belief that evidence will be located at a stated place at
the time of execution of the warrant. See id. at 1124 (citing ALAsKA STAT. §
12.35.020(3) (Michie 1990».
156. 424 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981).
157. See id. at 225.
158. See id. at 223.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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based on evidence that was not on the premises at the time of the
warrant's issuance. 165 Therefore, the defendant argued, the warrant
violated state law. 166 The court rejected the defendant's literal reading of the statute and explained that the essential question under
the state statute, as under the Fourth Amendment, is "whether 'the
evidence [stated in the affidavit] creates substantial probability that
the seizable property will be on the premises when searched.' "167
The court observed that the defendant's narrow interpretation
would not effectuate the purposes underlying the use of anticipatory warrants, all of which were consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the state statute. 168

B. Jurisdictions Suppressing Evidence Gathered Pursuant to Anticipatory
Search Warrants
Not all courts interpreting state statutes resembling the Fourth
Amendment have concluded that anticipatory warrants are consistent with state law. 169 While several states have upheld the validity of
anticipatory search warrants,170 a few states have prohibited their
165. See id. at 224 (discussing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 1 (West 1980». The
court describes the statute as providing that "warrants may [be] issue[d] in
criminal cases on a showing of probable cause to believe that defined property or articles, including 'property or articles the possession or control of
which is unlawful, are concealed' in the place to be searched." [d. at 225.
166. See id.
167. Id. (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (N.Y. 1972».
168. See id. at 224-25. For a discussion of the public policy initiatives underlying the
use of anticipatory warrants, see infra Section VI.A.
169. This is because of the federal structure of the American system of government. A citizen's first line of protection is found in the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see
supra note 9. A second line of protection for citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures resides in the case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (concluding that
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights must be suppressed from the government's case-in-chief). In addition to the United States Constitution and its case law, citizens enjoy the additional protection of their respective state statutes that address search and
seizure issues and probable cause requirements. See infra notes 176-211 and accompanying text. While states must at a minimum comply with the standards
set forth in the United States Constitution, they are free to require even more
stringent probable cause requirements for legal searches and seizures. See discussion infra Pa~ IV.A., V.
170. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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use. 171 In most cases, these states have done so because language in
their statutes prohibit the issuance of anticipatory warrants. 172 For
example, in Ex Parte Oswalt,173 the Supreme Court of Alabama held
that anticipatory search warrants were inconsistent with the Alabama
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 174 In Ex Parte Oswalt, a police officer
obtained an anticipatory warrant for the defendant's home based
on the knowledge that an undercover policeman would sell drugs
to Oswalt at that 10cation.175
. The court in Ex Parte Oswalt considered the language of Rule
3.8 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which uses both
present and past tense in authorizing search warrants. 176 The court
determined that the phrases "[w] as unlawfully obtained, . . . [w] as
used as the means of committing any offense, ... is in the possession of any person, [and] constitutes evidence of a criminal offense" required that there be probable cause to believe that the cocaine was located at Oswalt's premises at the time of the warrant's
issuance.177 The court also relied on a statute predating the rule
that required the evidence to be presently in the possession of the
171. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
172. See Ex Parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368, 373 (Ala. 1996) (construing an Alabama
Rule of Criminal Procedure which, based on a predecessor statute, authorized
search warrants if contraband was in the possession of the person or place to
be searched); People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Colo. 1995) (construing
a Colorado statute to imply that contraband must be at or on the location to
be searched before a warrant is issued); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992
(Fla. 1988) (per curiam) (concluding that an amendment to the state constitution lifted the ban on anticipatory search warrants); People v. Ross, 659
N.E.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Ill. 1991) (finding that a state statute required present
probable cause that a crime had been committed and further commenting
that the legislature should determine whether the use of anticipatory warrants
should be allowed); State v. Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1995) (construing a state statute to require that probable cause exist when a warrant is
issued, not at some future time); KosteJec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 236-37, 703
A.2d 160, 163 (1997) (holding that anticipatory search warrants are inconsistent with a state statute governing probable cause for the issuance of a warrant).
173. 686 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1996).
174. See id. at 372-73. While the State focused on whether anticipatory warrants are
per se unconstitutional, the court's analysis centered on whether "the specific
anticipatory search warrant in this case was authorized by Rule 3.8." [d. The
court conceded that anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional. See
id.
175. See id. at 370.
176. See id. at 373.
177. [d. at 373-74.
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person whose premises are to be searched. 178 As a result of the
court's literal interpretation of the statute, the anticipatory search
warrant for Oswalt's residence was held to be void. 179
In People v. Poirez,180 a Colorado court similarly interpreted a
state statute l81 to prohibit the use of anticipatory search warrants. 182
Here, the police obtained a search warrant for the defendant's
home because a package containing marijuana was to be delivered. 183 When the marijuana was delivered, police executed the warrant and arrested the defendant, Anthony Poirez, even though the
package was addressed to Brett Johnson. 184
Like Ex Parte Oswalt,185 the Poirez court held that anticipatory
search warrants were inconsistent with the state's search and seizure
statute. 186 The court observed that the language of the statute "creates a barrier to the issuance of anticipatory warrants by judicial officers."187 Like the Alabama provision involved in Ex Parte Oswalt,
the state statute required that the object of the search be present at
the designated location at the time the warrant was issued. 188 Moreover, the Colorado statute retained the language of the pre-1990 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) that prohibited anticipatory
warrants. 189 The court noted that it was the 1990 amendment to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) that allowed anticipatory
warrants. l90 Therefore, because the state legislature had retained the
178. See id. at 373. The court explained that the legislature had expressed no intention "to allow the issuance of a search warrant where, as in this case, the
crime to which the evidence at issue relates has not yet occurred and the evidence to be seized is not presently in the possession of the person whose
premises are to be searched. ~ Id.
179. See id. at 374.
180. 904 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1995).
181. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-303(1)(d) (West 1986) (requiring the affidavit
to "establish probable cause to believe that the property to be search[ed] for,
seized, or inspected is located at, in or upon the premises, person, place, or
thing to be searched").
182. See Poirez., 904 P.2d at 880-81.
183. See id. at 882.
184. See id.
185. For a discussion of Ex Parte Oswalt, see supra notes 173-79 and accompanying
text.
186. See Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 882-83.
189. See id. at 883.
190. See id. For this conclusion, the court looked to the advisory committee note
accompanying Rule 41(a). For the pertinent portion of this advisory commit-
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language of the pre-1990 rule, the court concluded that the statute
continued to prohibit anticipatory warrants. 191
The Supreme Court of Iowa also determined that anticipatory
search warrants were inconsistent with its state search warrant authorization statute in State v. Gillespie. 192 Here, state officials arrested
an individual who delivered cocaine to a confidential informant. 193
The individual agreed to cooperate with police and lead them to
his supplier, Gillespie. 194 The state police obtained a search warrant
for the defendant's home, conditioned on the informant's completion of a controlled drug buy from Gillespie and a field test of the
substance bought. 195 These events transpired and the warrant was
executed. 196
Iowa Code sections 808.3 and 808.4 require a sworn application
for a search warrant to include "facts, information, and circumstances tending to establish sufficient grounds for granting the application, and probable cause for believing that the grounds exist ... [and] upon a finding of probable cause for grounds to issue
a search warrant, the magistrate shall issue a warrant. "197 The court
concluded that "the plain meaning of these statutes is that probable
cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued and not at some
future time when the warrant is executed."198 The court relied on
language in each statute that required probable cause to exist as of
the exact moment when the warrant was issued. 199 Although the
lower court had found ambiguity in the statute and interpreted it
against the defendant, the appellate court failed to find the statute
unclear and reversed the defendant's conviction. 2oo
However, state statutes are becoming more and more receptive
of anticipatory warrants, as evidenced by the analysis of the Sutee note, see supra note 29.
See Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883.
530 N.W.2d 446 (Iowa 1995).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 448 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 808.3-808.4 (West 1994».
Id.
See id. The court noted the dictionary definition of words in the statute-"circumstance," "fact," and "information"-referred to the past or present only.
See id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICDONARY 113. 220. 311 (2d. ed. 1987».
From this, the court concluded that the statutes "do not contemplate future
acts or events as constituting probable cause." Id.
200. See id. at 449-50.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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preme Court of Florida in Bernie v. State. 201 The court held that an
amendment of the Florida Constitution .relating to search and
seizures brought Florida law into conformity with the federal case
law finding anticipatory search warrants constitutionap02 In Bernie,
the police obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the defendant's home after officials discovered cocaine in a package addressed
to him.203 The police executed the warrant after the controlled delivery and searched the defendant's home. 204
The defendant contended that the search of his home was invalid under both Florida statutory205 and common law. 206 The court
held that a 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution allowed
the use of anticipatory search warrants. 207 Mirroring the Fourth
Amendment, the amendment to the state constitution opened the
doors for anticipatory warrants. 20S Likewise, the court interpreted
the statutory law so as to permit anticipatory warrants, reasoning
that the statute:
allows a warrant to be issued when the evidence and supporting affidavit show that the drugs have already been discovered through a legal search and seizure and are presently in the process of being transported to the designated
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam).
See id. at 989.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 989-90 (citing FlA. STAT. ANN. § 938.18 (West 1996) (prohibiting issuance of warrants when "[t]he law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being
violated therein"».
206. See id. (citing Gerardi v. State, 307 So. 2d 853, 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975» (holding that state statutory law forbids the issuance of search warrants
unless a law is being currently violated at that location).
207. See id. at 990-91. Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, relating to
search and seizure, as amended in 1982 and effective January 3, 1983,
provided:
No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by
affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 990 (quoting FIA. CONST. art. I,
§ 12 (1982». It should be noted that the amended statute makes no
requirement that these things be located at the place to be searched
when the affidavit is actually sworn.
208. See id.
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residence which is being used as the drug drop. It is our
view that this is not the type of future allegation for a warrant that the legislature intended to prohibit by this
statute. 209
Like Florida, other states have also recently proposed legislation to amend their search warrant statutes to allow anticipatory
search warrants. For example, Colorado and Alabama have successfully amended their statutes to allow such warrants,210 while Rhode
Island and Hawaii have proposed legislation to change their respective state laws. 2Il
IV. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN MARYLAND
A. Historical Perspective

Until 1997, Maryland courts had not addressed the issue of anticipatory search warrants. In prior cases where anticipatory search
warrants were at issue, the Court of Appeals of Maryland based its
holdings on alternative grounds. 212 In addition to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,213 Maryland citizens
are protected against unreasonable search and seizures by Article 26
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 214 Except in certain cases, a
search of private property without consent is unreasonable unless it
209. [d. at 992.
210. See ALA. R CRIM. P. 3.7-3.8. In 1997, the Alabama Senate introduced Bill No.
150 to revise the related statute.
211. In 1997, the Hawaii Senate introduced Bill No. 2710 to amend the law for anticipatory search warrants. Further, Rhode Island Senate Bill No. 2844 proposed the amendment of the existing warrant statute to allow for anticipatory
warrants.
212. See infra notes 21845 and accompanying text.
213. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (making the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states). For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 9.
214. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 26 ("[AlII warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are
grievious and oppressive."). Article 26 is construed to be in pari materia with
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Gadson v. State,
341 Md. 1, 8 n.3, 668 A.2d 22, 26 n.3 (1995); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 492,
124 A.2d 764, 768 (1956). In addition to the Maryland Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment, the Maryland General Assembly passed a statute which
further protects citizens by laying out clear procedural requirements for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1999)
(providing that "any such search warrant shall name or describe, with reasonable particularity, the individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing
to be searched, the grounds for the search warrant and the name of the applicant on whose written application as aforesaid the warrant was issued").
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has been authorized by a valid search warrant.215
Additionally, section 551 (a) of Article 27 protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 216 Section 551 (a) is not a mere reiteration of the Maryland or United States Constitutions; it provides
substantive and procedural requirements for a valid warrant.217 However, it is often applied in addition to these constitutional protections. In Salmon v. State/Is the court of special appeals applied section 551 (a) to uphold the search of an individual who entered a
building as a warrant was being executed. 219 Salmon involved the
search of a laundromat for evidence of illegal gambling. 220 Executing a warrant, the police discovered illegal lottery tickets and other
incriminating evidence. 221 During the search, Salmon returned to
215. See Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309, 319, 379 A.2d 164, 169 (1977) ("[W]hether
a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.").
216. For the text of Article 27, Section 551(a), see infra note 254.
217. See In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 160, 458 A.2d 820,
826 (1983). The court of special appeals provided the following nine requirements for a valid warrant:
(1) that it be issued by a judge; (2) that the application be in writing; (3) that it be signed by the applicant; (4) that it be sworn by the
applicant; (5) that it be accompanied by an affidavit containing ...
facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant; (6) that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed or that
property subject to a seizure is located on a person or in a place; (7)
that the individual or place to be searched be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the judge; (8) that the warrant be issued to a duly
constituted policeman; and (9) that the warrant name or describe
with reasonable particularity, the individual, building, apartment,
premises, place or thing to be searched.
Id. at 168, 458 A.2d at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted). A failure of
any of the nine requirements would render the warrant unlawful, and a failure of numbers 1, 4, 6, or 9 (or, arguably 7) would render the warrant unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 169, 458 A.2d at 830.
218. 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967).
219. See id. at 519, 235 A.2d at 761; see also State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md.
132, 138,486 A.2d 174, 177 (1985). The Intercontinental Limited court observed:
To justify the issuance of such a warrant, the statute [551 (a)] appears
to require that probable cause first be shown that "any misdemeanor
or felony" is being committed; ... and that in connection therewith
"property" subject or liable to seizure "under the criminal laws of
this State" is located upon the individual or at the place or thing to
be searched.
Id. at 138, 486 A.2d at 177.
220. See Salmon, 2 Md. App. at 516, 235 A.2d at 759.
221. See id. at 516, 235 A.2d at 759-60.
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the premises, indicating that she was the owner.222 Mter the officers
identified themselves, the defendant left the premises. 223 Police
stopped her outside the laundromat and secured evidence of illegal
gambling on her person. 224 Although the court held that there must
be probable cause that a crime has been committed, the court
found that the search of the defendant was valid due in part to her
flight from the premises after she was shown the search warrant. 225
Several decisions following Salmon have interpreted section 551 (a)
to require that items of interest in a search warrant must be on the
person or premises at the time the affidavit is swom. 226
In Cable v. State,227 the court of special appeals intimated its
stance on the validity of anticipatory warrants. 228 In Cable, police officers received information that a woman would be arriving at the
airport carrying percodan and dilaudid intended for sale in Balti-

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 516-17,235 A.2d at 759-60.
See id. at 522-23, 235 A.2d at 763.
See Wiebking v. State, 19 Md. App. 226, 237, 310 A.2d 577, 584 (1973) (finding
a warrant invalid because the police did not have facts that gave probable
cause to believe a crime was being .committed or that evidence was in the vehicle); German v. State, 14 Md. App. 120, 126,286 A.2d 171, 174 (1972) (noting that a warrant may be issued if a prudent and cautious man would be justified in believing that the offense had been or was being committed);
Buckner v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 60-61, 272 A.2d 828, 832 (1971) (observing
that a judge may issue a warrant when there is probable cause to believe that
a crime is being committed and that evidence of the crime is on the person
or at the place to be searched); Iannone v. State, 10 Md. App. 81, 87-88, 267
A.2d 812, 816 (1970) (explaining that because a warrant is for particular persons and premises, it does not authorize a search of all persons in the building); Grimm v. State, 6 Md. App. 321, 326-27, 251 A.2d 230, 233-34 (1968)
(finding that the allegations in the warrant application must show that an offense had been or was being committed); Hall v. State, 5 Md. App. 394, 39697, 247 A.2d 548, 549-50 (1968) (providing that probable cause must be
proven by the facts in the affidavit showing that a crime has been committed); Kist v. State, 4 Md. App. 282, 284-85, 242 A.2d 586, 587 (1968) (reiterating that probable cause evidence must be confined solely to the affidavit);
Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 44, 237 A.2d 774, 778 (1968) (requiring the judge
to be informed of the underlying circumstances in order to particularize the
warrant); Scott v. State, 4 Md. App. 482, 488-89, 243 A.2d 609, 613-14 (1967)
(stating that probable cause requires a proper showing that a crime is being
committed or evidence is on the person).
227. 65 Md. App. 493, 501 A.2d 108 (1985).
228. See id. at 494, 501 A.2d at 109.
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more.229 The officers received an anticipatory warrant to search the
defendant's bags and belongings when she arrived at the airport. 23o
Upon arrival, the defendant was followed by police to a hotel and
was arrested. 231 A search of the bags revealed a claim ticket for a
briefcase being held in a security room at the hotel. 232 Without obtaining a search warrant, the police seized the briefcase that contained the drugs. 233 The defendant challenged the seizure of the
drugs, arguing that the search warrant was invalid because it was anticipatory in nature. 234
Although the defendant argued that section 551 of Article 27
prohibited the use of anticipatory warrants, the court concluded
that this interpretation was "too restrictive a reading of the statute."235 Rather than addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants,
the court concentrated on the control exercised by the defendant
over the briefcase. 236 The court characterized the defendant's possession of the briefcase as "constructive"-even though the defendant was not actually carrying the briefcase at the time of the arrest,
the police could search it in the room because she possessed a
claim check for the briefcase and the warrant expressly included
the briefcase. 237 The Cable court also reasoned that even if the warrant was defective, it fulfilled the good faith requirement established in United States v. Leon,238 thereby causing the exclusionary
rule not to apply.239 However, the court of special appeals was not
the only Maryland court to decide the issue of anticipatory warrants
on alternative grounds.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

235.
236.
237.
238.

239.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 495, 501 A.2d at 109.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 497, 501 A.2d at 110-11. The defendant argued that at the time the
search warrant was issued, she had not yet committed a crime in Baltimore
City, but that the police had based the warrant on the anticipation that drugs
would be moved to the city. See id.
[d. at 497,501 A.2d at 111.
See id. at 495-97,501 A.2d at 109-11.
See id.
468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate, even if the warrant was subsequently
found to be invalid).
See Cabk, 65 Md. App. at 498, 501 A.2d at 111. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 261-76 and accompanying text.

1999]

Anticipatory Search Warrants

367

In State v. Lee,24O the court of appeals narrowly avoided the issue
of anticipatory search warrants. Based on information provided by a
confidential informant, the police obtained a search warrant conditioned on the purchase of LSD by the informant's brother. 241 The
court avoided the anticipatory search warrant issue by determining
that the informant's information failed to establish probable cause
under Illinois v. Gates. 242 Consequently, the search warrant was invalid whether or not it was anticipatory.243 Although the court acknowledged that "a number of appellate courts have addressed the
constitutionality of anticipatory warrants, "244 it refused to decide the
case on these grounds because the record did not "compel a constitutional review of anticipatory search warrants, which must await a
future case. "245

B. Maryland's Current Approach to Anticipatory Warrants
In 1997, the Court of Appeals of Maryland confronted that "future case" in Kostelec v. State. 246 Kostelec presented the common anticipatory warrant scenario, where police intercepted a package containing PCP mailed to a defendant. 247 Law enforcement personnel
made a controlled delivery to Lucabaugh's address and arrested
him shortly after he left his home with the package. 248 Lucabaugh
then informed the police that the package was to be delivered to
Roarke Boulton. 249 The police determined that Boulton actually
240. 330 Md. 320, 624 A.2d 492 (1993).
241. See id. at 323-25, 624 A.2d at 493-94.
242. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that the reliability of infonnation is to be
judged under the totality of the circumstances, including considerations of
the veracity and basis of knowledge of the infonnant). Gates replaced the former two-pronged test found in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Refusing
to uphold the defendant's conviction, the Lee court observed that the information underlying the warrant provided no indication as to the veracity of
the infonnant or the basis of his knowledge. See Lee, 330 Md. at 326-27, 624
A.2d at 495.
243. See Lee, 330 Md. at 326-27, 646 A.2d at 495. Notably, the State did not raise the
Leon good faith exception to the exclUSionary rule. See id. at 327 n.l, 624 A.2d
at 495 n.l.
244. [d. at 328, 646 A.2d at 496.
245. [d. at 329, 646 A.2d at 496.
246. 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997).
247. See id. at 232-33, 703 A.2d at 161.
248. See id. at 233, 703 A.2d at 161.
249. See id.
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lived with the defendant, Kostelec. 250 An anticipatory search warrant
was then obtained for the defendant's address to be executed after
police delivered the package. 251 The package was delivered and accepted by the defendant.252 Subsequently, the warrant was executed
and the defendant was arrested. 253
Kostelec moved to suppress the evidence gathered at his home,
arguing that the search warrant did not comply with the narrowly
drawn section 551254 and that anticipatory search warrants had never
been validated by the Maryland legislature. 255 The court of appeals
granted certiorari solely on the question of whether an anticipatory
search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit lacking probable
cause that a crime was being committed at the time of the issuance
was in compliance with Article 27, section 551(a).256 The court of
appeals interpreted the present tense verbs of section 551 (a) to require probable cause to exist at the time the affidavit is sworn for a
warrant. 257 The court literally interpreted the statute, requiring the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See id.
See id. at 233-34, 703 A.2d at 161.
See id. at 234, 703 A.2d at 162.
See id.
Article 27, section 551 (a) provides:
Whenever it be made to appear to any judge . . . by written application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affidavit . . . containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant . . . that there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set
forth in said affidavit ... to believe that any misdemeanor or felony
is being committed by any individual or in any building ... or that
any property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is
situated or located on the person of any such individual or in or on
any such building . . . then the judge may forthwith issue a search
warrant.
[d. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1997».
255. See id. at 234-35, 703 A.2d at 162.
256. See id. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163. On direct appeal, the court of special appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision and rejected Kostelec's argument that anticipatory search warrants did not comply with the language found in section
551(a) of Article 27. See Kostelec v. State, 112 Md. App. 656, 670-71, 685 A.2d
1222, 1229-30 (1996) (finding the language of the Maryland statute "at best
ambiguous"), rev'd, 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997). The court of special appeals held that section 551 (a) was in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment which has been held to permit anticipatory search warrants. See id. at
669-70,685 A.2d at 1229. The court noted that it should not decide a constitutional issue unless the record compels such a determination, and the court
rested on the construction of section 551 (a) only. See id.
257. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163.
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crime underlying the probable cause is currently "being committed," and that the property "is situated or located" on the described
premises at the time the magistrate is asked to issue the search war~
rant.258 The court concluded that "[ t] he incompatibility of the language of section 551 (a) with anticipatory warrants is explained by
the fact that the language under consideration formed part of the
statute's original enactment by Chapter 749 of the Acts of 1939,
[which was] long before anticipatory warrants came into use."259
The court held that anticipatory search warrants are not authorized
in Maryland and reversed the decision of the court of special
appea1s.260
1. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Nexus with Article 27, Section 551

Once the Kostelec court found anticipatory warrants inconsistent
with section 551, the next natural question for the court was the appropriate remedy. For constitutional violations, courts apply the exclusionary rule-a court-created remedy suppressing evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's rights from use in the
government's case-in-chief. 261 The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage police misconduct by removing the temptation to violate citizens' constitutional rights. 262 The exclusionary rule
lost a significant amount of its effectiveness as a deterrent after the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Leon. 263 In Leon, the
Court adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and
reasoned that officers should not be punished for executing warrants that they believe, in good faith, are valid. 264 Prior to Kostelec,
258. See id. The court quoted a portion of Article 27, section 551 (a) which specifi-

259.
260.
261.

262.

263.
264.

cally requires "that there is probable cause . . . to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed . . . or that any property subject to
seizure ... is situated or located ... in or on any such building." Id.
Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163.
See id. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (excluding evidence that the accused was forced to give as a result of an unlawful seizure); see also WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN. supra note 33, at 17.
See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (observing that a purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct); United Statesv.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (observing that the exclusionary rule is designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect); see
also David P. Mitchell, Anticipatary Search Warrants: The Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reexamine the Framework of the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1387,
1396-98 (1991) (discussing the evolution of the exclusionary rule).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
See id. at 913; see also Mitchell, supra note 262, at 1396.
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the Leon decision was closely tied to the issue of anticipatory warrants in Maryland. This tie is exemplified in both Cable and McDonald, where the courts invoked the good faith exception when the
warrant was found to be defective. 265
The court in Kostelec chose not to address the issue of whether
the exclusionary rule was the proper remedy for a violation of Article 27, section 551.266 However, it is doubtful that the court of appeals would impose the exclusionary rule for violations of the statute. In previous Maryland decisions, the court has intimated that
Article 27, section 551 contains no exclusionary remedy.267
In re SPecial Investigation No. 228,268 provides a detailed analysis
of Article 27, section 551 and its relation to the exclusionary rule. 269
The court in In re Special Investigation No. 228 explained that Article
27, section 551 does not require a court to apply the exclusionary
rule to remedy a violation of the statute. 270 While the statute does
provide that evidence seized should be returned to the rightful
owner, it is silent on the issue of whether the evidence can be used
in the government's case-ln-chief.271
The Court of Appeals of Maryland again addressed the exclusionary rule in conjunction with Article 27, section 551 in Chu v.
Anne Arundel County.272 Here, the defendant argued that property
taken from him. during an illegal search and seizure should not be
included in an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 273 While acknowledging the existence of the exclusionary rule for Fourth
Amendment violations, the court held that Chu was not entided to

265. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Cable v.
State, 65 Md. App. 493 (1985); see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948).
266. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 243, 703 A.2d 160, 166 (1997).
267. See Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 686, 537 A.2d 250, 256 (1988)
(noting that section 551 (a) does not contain an exclusionary rule); see also In
re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 157-65, 458 A.2d 820, 824-28
(1983) (contrasting the Fourth Amendment with section 551(a) of Article 27).
268. 54 Md. App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (1983).
269. See id. at 159-77, 458 A.2d at 825-35.
270. See id. at 166-68, 458 A.2d at 825-34.
271. See id. at 166-67,458 A.2d at 829. Subsection (c) of the statute mandates that
property rightfully taken must be returned after there is no further need for
the retention of the property. See id. at 167, 458 A.2d at 829. This implies that
it can be retained until after presentation of the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
272. 311 Md. 673, 537 A.2d 250 (1988).
273. See id. at 686, 537 A.2d at 251.
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such a remedy under Article 27, section 551. 274
Much like the courts in In re Special Investigation No. 228 and
Chu, the Kostelec court failed to find an exclusionary remedy in Article 27, section 551.275 However, because the State failed to raise this
issue in Kostelec's suppression hearing, the court refused to rule on
the availability of the exclusionary rule to Kostelec's case. 276 Thus,
when addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants in Maryland, future courts may still permit the use of the evidence obtained
through such warrants even though they have been held to be in violation of the Maryland statute.

C. Anticipatory Search Warrants: Their Future in Maryland
Several state courts, including Florida, Colorado, and Alabama,
have held that anticipatory warrants are inconsistent with their respective state statutes and have indicated that the state statutes will
have to be amended to achieve a different result.277 Through its
holding that anticipatory search warrants are inconsistent with Maryland statutory law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has sent a
clear message to the Maryland General Assembly that it is time to
amend the law. 278 In Kostelec, the court gave no definite implication
as to how they would rule on the issue if anticipatory warrants were
allowed by statute. 279 However, the case law from a multitude of federal courts and states that have amended their statutes suggests that
anticipatory warrants remain within the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment. 280
By disallowing anticipatory search warrants, Maryland courts deprive law enforcement agencies of a powerful tool to combat drug
trafficking. Anticipatory search warrants aid law enforcement of-·
ficers in their effort to combat drug traffickers, who easily move evidence before officers can obtain traditional search warrants. Without this asset, which is readily available to law enforcement in most
other jurisdictions in the nation,281 local law enforcement will likely
lobby aggressively for an amendment to the current Maryland law.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 680, 537 A.2d at 256.
Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 240-42, 703 A.2d 160, 165-66 (1997).
id.
supra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
Kostelec, 348 Md. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165.
supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
supra notes 131-68 and accompanying text.
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Given today's anti-crime climate,282 it is likely that law-makers would
likewise support an amendment to the statute, so as to bolster the
effectiveness of law enforcement. 283
In February of 1998, Maryland House Bill 706 was introduced
in the Maryland legislature calling for the repeal, amendment, and
re-enactment of Article 27, section 551 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. 284 Bill 706 proposed that Article 27, section 551 be
amended to include the future tense language, "there is probable
cause . . . to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed OR WILL BE COMMIITED."285 However, this Bill failed in
the judiciary committee, and the law in Maryland remains unchanged for now. 286
V. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE SUPREME
COURT

Even if Article 27, section 551(a) is amended to permit anticipatory search warrants,287 these warrants may be challenged on constitutional grounds. However, a majority of courts that have addressed the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants have concluded
that they are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 288 Although no Maryland court has addressed the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants,289 the girth of federal case law
282. See Sara S. Beale, Whats Law Got to Do with It? The Politica~ Socia~ Psychological
and Other Non-l£gal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23, 40-47 (detailing the political climate, the media's effect
on the public's perception of crime, and explaining the history and reasoning
underlying the public's current anti-crime attitude); Richard L. Burke, Crime is
Becoming Nation s Top Fear: Poll Shows Economy Losing First Place as a Concern,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at Al (discussing the fact that Americans now view
crime as the most important problem that society faces today).
283. See Kenneth Jost, Exclusionary Rul£ Reforms Advance, 81 A.B.AJ., May 1995, at 18
(discussing a move by the Republican majorities in Congress to pass legislation that would effectively abolish the exclusionary rule in federal courts because the rule favors criminals, and "We're losing convictions all around the
country").
284. See H.B. 706 (Md. 1998).
285. Id. at 2.
286. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1996 & Supp. 1998). The fact that the
statute has remained unchanged to date leads to the conclusion that the bill
was not accepted.
287. In order for an anticipatory search warrant to be permitted in Maryland, the
language of Article 27, section 551 (a) must be amended to include the future
tense language-"will be committed."
288. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
289. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230,236,703 A.2d 160, 162 (1997). Although an-
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indicates that future. constitutional challenges to these warrants may
be decided by the Supreme Court.
If the Supreme Court were to actually grant a writ of certiorari
to address anticipatory search warrants, these would likely be upheld. During the Warren Court era, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the defendant's federally protected constitutional
rights. 290 Since the end of the Warren Court, the Court's attitude toward this issue has shifted dramatically. 29 I A prevalent theme of the
post-Warren Courts is that "the ultimate mission of the criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and let the innocent go free. "292
The decisions of the post-Warren Courts suggest that "the rights
enumerated in the Constitution are not all entitled to the same degree of judicial protection, but instead should be valued according
to their impact on the adequacy of the guilt determining
process. "293
Post-Warren courts have considerably watered down the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable search and seizure with their
less than enthusiastic treatment of the exclusionary rule. 294 Unlike
the Warren Court, which preferred the adoption of specific rules to

290.

291.

292.
293.
294.

other ground of attack may be Article 26 of the Maryland Constitution, this
will likely be a weak argument because this provision is interpreted in pari
materia with the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 212 and accompanying
text.
In the early and mid-1960s, the Court began creating a wide variety of rules
designed to provide those involved in the criminal justice system with adequate protection from overreaching by the state. An example of this is Mapp
v. Ohio, in which the Court held that any evidence seized in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be excluded from state and federal prosecution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in
1970, and Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist in 1972. Rehnquist became
Chief Justice in 1987. The appointment of Justice Rehnquist has been deemed
to be the beginning of a conservative era for the Court. See Carol S. Steiker,
Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2468 (1996) ("[TJhe Court has clearly become
less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating of assertions of the need for public order."); James F. Simon, Speech: Politics and the
Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y.L. Sm. L. REv. 863, 863-64 (1996) ("Rehnquist's conservative vision would severely limit the protections of civil rights litigants
under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights statutes, and, in general,
approve governmental authority at the expense of individual rights.").
WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 33, § 1.02, at 4.
Id.
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653-54.
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guide law enforcement officers and courts, subsequent Courts have
relied on a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine
probable cause. 295 Although affording police and courts more flexibility in evaluating probable cause, this approach has facilitated
standardless police conduct. As a result of the Court's "totality of
the circumstances" approach, there has been a relaxation of constitutional restrictions on law enforcement. 296
Moreover, today's Court employs the "Crime Control Model" of
criminal procedure, which places a premium on efficiency and
quick adjudication of defendants. 297 This model of criminal procedure requires that any limitation placed on law enforcement officials should be solely out of a desire to promote the reliability of
the outcome; purely technical controls on police behavior are inconsistent with this model of the criminal process. 298 Under this
model, anticipatory search warrants are a "purely technical control;"299 the current Court would likely view these warrants as a
merely technical restraint on police behavior, which would unnecessarily delay police in bringing the guilty to justice. Therefore, the
current Court would likely endorse the use of anticipatory warrants
by finding them to be valid under the Fourth Amendment.

295. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) ("[The] totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable
cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip. H); if. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (explaining
that the Court has moved away from a two step standing inquiry to the single
question of "whether government officials violated any legitimate expectation
of privacy"); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977) (recognizing
that when addressing the constitutionality of extrajudicial identifications the
test is whether the identification was reliable under a totality of the circumstances).
296. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (permitting search of car's interior when the occupant is arrested); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (permitting a search incident to a lawful arrest for all crimes);
see also Mitchell, supra note 33, at 1400-·07.
297. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN. supra note 33, § 1.03, at 9 (discussing Herbert
Packer's study of the criminal process in Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, pt. II, ch. 8, at 149 (1968».
298. See id. at 10.
299. [d.
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. VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF ANTICIPATORY SEARCH
WARRANTS
A. The Advantages of Anticipatory Warrants
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that anticipatory
warrants can provide significant advantages to law enforcement officers seeking to protect the public. Proponents of anticipatory warrants see them as a necessary weapon in the "War on DrugS."300 The
evolution of the inner city drug trade includes ~n increased use of
crack houses, from which dealers can distribute drugs quickly after
delivery. This mobility indicates that law enforcement personnel
should be able to rely on anticipatory warrants as a means to seize
large drug shipments before they are moved. 301 Proponents also
claim that any dangers posed by anticipatory warrants can be controlled by judges and magistrates who place strict guidelines on
their use. 302 The analytical breakdowns undertaken by the Garcid303
and Gendron304 courts support this argument by creating the impression that judges and magistrates consider a strict set of criteria
before issuing anticipatory warrants. 305
In the context of government agents intercepting illegal material in the mail, anticipatory warrants also serve a useful purpose for
law enforcement and society as a whole. For example, in the case of
intercepted child pornography, merely destroying the contraband
would only provide a short-term solution to a social pathology.306 On
the other hand, an anticipatory warrant for the premises where the
child pornography is to be delivered allows law enforcement to arrest the subscriber and limit the child exploitation market at the
same time. 307
Another valid argument presented by ·proponents of anticipatory warrants is that without them, law enforcement will be left with
the option to conduct warrantless searches under the guise of the
exigent circumstances exception. 3og \Vithout the protection of a
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See Powers, supra note 31, at 59.
See ill. at 62.
See id. at 63.
For a discussion of Garcia, see supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Gendron, see supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-86, 114-30 and accompanying text.
See Adams, supra note 32, at 701-02.
See id.
See Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (asserting that "the need to
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency" (quoting Wayne v.
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sworn affidavit before a neutrally detached magistrate, the possibility
of police misconduct increases. 309

B. The Dangers of Anticipatory Warrants
The primary dangers associated with anticipatory search warrants are the power and discretion that they entrust to law enforcement personnel. By relying on the prophetic testimony of police officers as to events that will occur in the future, courts no longer
base the issuance of warrants on facts that exist, but rather are· permitted to base warrants on facts that may exist in the future. 3lO With
the establishment of the good faith exception in Leon,311 it is even
more dangerous when police inaccurately predict future events and
execute searches based on their flawed predictions. 312
While anticipatory search warrants can be practical law enforcement tools for combating the distribution of illegal narcotics and
other contraband, they provide officials with ample opportunity to
abuse their discretion. Originally, the "on a sure course" requirement provided a guarantee that a package containing contraband
had an established destination and law enforcement could obtain
warrants in anticipation of the delivery of the package to that address.313 Yet, subsequent applications of the "on a sure course" test
have diluted the strict criteria for the issuance of anticipatory warrants. 314 The Garcia decision went even further to shy away from
strict adherence to the "on a sure course" test by applying a list of
criteria that reflects a "totality of the circumstances" motif.315 Without the strict application of the "on a sure course" test, law enforce-

309.

310.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963»); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Harden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (indicating that the Fourth
Amendment will not impede an investigation when doing so would endanger
lives); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing a
warrantless search based on the exigency of locating explosive materials used
to produce methamphetamine); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 33, §
9.01-04, at 202-08 (discussing the parameters of the evanescent evidence exception to the warrant requirement); Messina, supra note 6, at 408.
See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
See Messina, supra note 6, at 407-08 (discussing the dangers of anticipatory
warrants).
For a discussion of Leon, see supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see
supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Garcia, see supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
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ment personnel now have the opportunity to manipulate a package's final destination, thereby enhancing the possibility of abuse.
This danger was clearly illustrated in Kostelec. 316 Here, police arrested a man after he left his home with a package that the police
knew to contain PCP.317 Mter police arrested the man, they relied
on his statements to obtain an anticipatory search warrant for the
home of Kostelec. 318 Although the package was not addressed to
Kostelec, the police arranged to have it delivered to his home. 319
Without the information supplied by the individual who had been
arrested for possession of narcotics, the police would have been unable to determine that Kostelec's home was the package's final destination. This factual scenario suggests that police have the ability to
orchestrate the delivery of a package to any address and, more importantly, to obtain a search warrant for that address in anticipation
of its delivery. Although the court in Kostelec never addressed the
"on a sure course" issue, the facts are not completely different from
those in Garcia, where a federal court upheld a search pursuant to
an anticipatory warrant even though there was no "sure course" for
the contraband. 320
In addition to the possible abuse of police discretion that can
accompany the use of anticipatory search warrants, revisions of the
standards for determining probable cause present a precarious proposition. Due to the Supreme Court's abandonment of clear criteria
for probable cause determinations,321 what seems legally permissible
under the "totality of the circumstances" rubric can lead down a
slippery slope away from adherence to the fundamental principles
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The use of anticipatory search warrants has been widely accepted by both federal and state courts. 322 State courts that have
suppressed evidence gathered pursuant to anticipatory warrants
have done so solely because they contradicted the requirements for
valid search warrants in state statutes. 323 Kostelec forced Maryland
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

For a discussion of Kostelec, see supra notes 246-60 and accompanying text.
See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 209, 232-33, 703 A.2d 160, 161 (1997).
See id. at 233, 703 A.2d at 161.
See id. at 232-33, 703 A.2d at 161.
See supra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
See supra Section V.
See supra Sections II., III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
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courts to confront whether anticipatory search warrants were valid
under state law and have consequently brought about a temporary
end to their use. 324
Although anticipatory search warrants have been held to be inconsistent under current law,325 this does not mean that Maryland
has forever bid farewell to the use of such warrants. Anticipatory
search warrants provide a valuable tool for law enforcement in their
efforts to combat drug trlUfickers who can easily move the evidence
of their crimes before police officers are able to obtain traditional
search warrants. 326
If the law in Maryland were amended to allow for the use of
anticipatory search warrants, the validity of such warrants could only
be attacked on Fourth Amendment grounds. 327 The Supreme Court
has yet to grant certiorari on the issue of anticipatory search warrants; judging from the Court's current conservative posture, it is
likely that anticipatory warrants would be held constitutionaP28
Yet, there is a strong temptation for law enforcement officials
to abuse anticipatory warrants. 329 The ability of officials to obtain
search warrants for locations that they contend will contain evidence of a crime sometime in the future creates the possibility of
police error and misconduct. 33o As seen in Kostelec, police can manipulate where illegal materials are delivered and then obtain war. rants for that location.331 If anticipatory search warrants are permitted in Maryland in the future, it is essential that their use be
governed by strict guidelines and procedures to prevent a further
erosion of the rights of Maryland citizens.332

Andrew M. Belt
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